INEC’s AI Experiment: Nigerians Need Transparency, Not Another Reason To Doubt The Ballot

Nigeria is approaching another defining moment in its democratic journey, and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) must understand that the greatest challenge confronting it ahead of the 2027 general elections is not the absence of technology but the urgent need to restore and sustain public confidence in the electoral process. Against this background, the commission’s announcement that it has established an Artificial Intelligence Division and commenced integrating AI tools into its results verification and cybersecurity systems deserves more than a routine administrative response. It demands rigorous public scrutiny, an unambiguous explanation of its objectives and a transparent demonstration that the proposed innovation will make elections more credible, not more complicated.

Artificial intelligence has become an increasingly important instrument in modern governance, security, financial services and information management. Properly deployed, it can identify suspicious patterns, detect attempts to manipulate digital systems, expose inconsistencies in large volumes of data and strengthen the capacity of institutions to respond to emerging threats. There is, therefore, nothing inherently wrong with INEC exploring the possibilities offered by AI. Indeed, an electoral commission that refuses to understand or prepare for technological change could expose the country's democratic process to risks that are becoming more sophisticated by the day.

Yet the question before Nigeria is not whether artificial intelligence has useful applications. It is whether INEC has established the institutional safeguards, technical competence, operational transparency and public accountability necessary to deploy it responsibly in an election whose outcome will determine the country's political direction for the next four years.

That distinction is fundamental. Technology is a tool, not a guarantee of integrity. It can strengthen a credible process, but it can also magnify the weaknesses of a poorly designed one. Where public confidence is already under pressure, introducing a new technological layer without sufficiently explaining its purpose, limits and safeguards risks deepening the very suspicions the innovation is supposed to dispel.

The Shadow of 2023 Must Not Be Ignored

INEC Chairman, Professor Joash Amupitan, disclosed the initiative at a press conference and national stakeholders' meeting in Abuja, convened to mark 100 days to the first ballot of the 2027 elections. According to the report, the commission is integrating automated AI auditing tools into its results verification process under a five-pillar AI Governance Framework, with mandatory human oversight, while also developing AI-driven systems to detect anomalies in database traffic and protect public portals against cyber intrusions and unauthorised alterations.

These are potentially worthwhile objectives. Cybersecurity is indispensable to modern elections, particularly when electoral information is transmitted, stored, displayed and accessed through interconnected digital platforms. An effective monitoring system could alert INEC to suspicious access attempts, unusual changes in data traffic or possible efforts to compromise its electronic infrastructure. Likewise, carefully designed analytical tools could assist trained officials in identifying inconsistencies that require further examination.

However, the commission is introducing these plans into an environment shaped by the controversies surrounding the 2023 general elections. Questions about the transmission and visibility of results, the performance of the INEC Result Viewing portal, and the relationship between results announced at polling units and figures presented at subsequent stages of collation continue to influence how many Nigerians assess electoral reforms.

INEC may dispute particular allegations or maintain that aspects of the previous election complied with the law, but it cannot wish away the consequences of widespread public distrust. In a democracy, the credibility of an election depends not only on the legal validity of its outcome but also on the ability of citizens to understand and independently scrutinise the process through which that outcome was reached.

The lesson of 2023 should therefore be unmistakable: electoral technology must be accompanied by transparency that allows political parties, election observers, journalists and ordinary citizens to verify what happened, when it happened and who was responsible.

If the commission intends to deploy artificial intelligence in 2027, it must first explain precisely which shortcomings the technology is designed to address and why existing procedures, properly enforced, cannot adequately address them. Nigerians deserve to know whether the AI initiative is primarily a cybersecurity measure, a supplementary auditing mechanism or a component of the process used to verify results. These functions are not interchangeable, and the distinction matters enormously.

INEC must not allow the public to confuse a system designed to identify suspicious digital activity with one authorised to determine whether votes are valid or which candidate has won an election.

AI Must Never Become A Substitute For Verifiable Results

One of the most troubling aspects of the controversy is the possibility that Nigerians may interpret AI-assisted verification as a new, opaque stage in the determination of election results. Such a perception would be dangerous, whether or not it reflects INEC's actual intentions.

The commission must make it categorically clear that artificial intelligence will not replace the legally prescribed procedures for recording, collating and declaring election results. Votes are cast by citizens, counted according to the law and documented through established electoral forms. Technology may support the authentication, transmission, comparison and auditing of those records, but it must not become an unexplained authority standing between the electorate and the final outcome.

The distinction between verification and determination is particularly important. An AI tool may flag discrepancies between figures in different records, identify unusual patterns or indicate that a digital document requires further examination. Those findings should trigger investigation by authorised electoral officials, not automatically invalidate a result, alter a candidate's votes or produce a different outcome.

Algorithms can make mistakes. They can be trained on incomplete or unrepresentative data, misinterpret unusual but legitimate circumstances, or generate misleading assessments when the information supplied to them is defective. Even systems that perform well under controlled conditions can encounter difficulties when confronted with the unpredictable realities of a nationwide election.

Consequently, INEC must disclose the limits of the proposed technology and establish procedures for resolving disagreements between automated findings and original election records. Every adverse finding must be explainable, open to challenge and capable of independent verification. Where an algorithm flags a polling-unit result, for instance, the relevant officials should be able to identify the discrepancy, inspect the underlying documents and explain the decision taken.

No candidate should lose votes because a software system has raised an unexplained suspicion, and no candidate should gain votes because an algorithm has accepted an incorrect digital record. The original evidence, the legally authorised process and the applicable electoral rules must remain decisive.

This is not an argument against technological innovation. It is an argument for placing innovation firmly within the boundaries of electoral law and democratic accountability.

The Deepfake Warning Requires A Serious Response

Professor Amupitan also warned that generative AI, voice cloning and deepfake videos could be used to fabricate the voices of election officials, doctor result sheets, counterfeit official letterheads and circulate false information faster than it can be verified. His warning is timely and should not be dismissed simply because some political actors are suspicious of the commission's wider AI plans.

The threats are real in principle. A fabricated announcement attributed to an electoral officer could provoke confusion in a closely contested constituency. A doctored result sheet circulated online could mislead supporters, inflame political tensions and undermine confidence in an otherwise properly conducted poll. A convincing synthetic recording could falsely suggest that an official had admitted manipulating results or issued instructions to collation officers.

The danger is not confined to opposition parties or the ruling establishment. Any political actor, criminal network or group seeking to destabilise the process could exploit the accessibility of synthetic media to spread disinformation.

Nevertheless, INEC must not confuse the existence of these threats with proof that deploying AI in result verification is necessarily the best or only response. Indeed, the chairman's warning reinforces the need for careful system design, because AI-generated content can deceive human observers as well as automated detection tools.

No deepfake detector is infallible, and no technological system should be treated as an unquestionable authority on the authenticity of a recording, photograph or document. A sophisticated detection tool can produce false positives and false negatives, while fabricated content can be altered to evade detection.

INEC's response must therefore combine technical detection with reliable channels of official communication, prompt publication of authentic records, trained verification personnel and cooperation with credible media organisations. The commission should maintain an accessible public verification mechanism through which citizens can check disputed announcements and determine whether documents attributed to it are genuine.

Its advice to journalists to establish fact-checking desks and verify election-related information before publication is appropriate. But this responsibility must be reciprocal. INEC must make accurate information readily available, respond promptly to legitimate inquiries and avoid unnecessary delays that allow false narratives to flourish.

The chairman's observation that it is more important to be right than to be first is sound. Yet the commission must equally recognise that, in the digital age, timely official communication is one of the most effective defences against misinformation.

An Unfinished Policy Is A Reason For Caution

The Obidient Movement has rejected the proposed deployment of AI in results collation, arguing that INEC should prioritise restoring public confidence and ensuring that every result remains independently verifiable. The National Chairman of the African Democratic Congress, Senator David Mark, has also expressed opposition to any attempt to manipulate the electoral process, while other Nigerians quoted in the report have questioned the timing, competence and motives behind the initiative.

Some of the criticisms are expressed in sweeping terms, including allegations that the plan is designed to help the ruling All Progressives Congress. Such accusations should not be accepted as established facts without credible evidence. Political suspicion, however strongly expressed, is not proof of electoral misconduct.

But neither should INEC dismiss every objection as partisan hostility. Opposition parties have a legitimate interest in understanding any new mechanism that may affect the verification of election results. Civil society organisations, professional bodies, election observers and ordinary voters are equally entitled to demand explanations about technologies introduced into a process whose credibility affects the entire country.

The concern that INEC is still finalising its AI policy is particularly deserving of attention. If the commission intends to deploy these tools in the 2027 elections, it must publish the governing framework sufficiently early to permit meaningful scrutiny, independent technical assessment and practical testing before election day.

A policy that remains under development cannot inspire confidence merely because the commission assures Nigerians that human oversight will be mandatory. What does that oversight entail? Who will supervise the systems? Which officials will be authorised to review or override an automated finding? What happens when the technology fails? Can political parties obtain the records necessary to challenge an AI-assisted assessment? Will independent experts be allowed to examine the systems and test their reliability?

These are not hostile questions. They are essential questions in any responsible programme of public-sector innovation.

INEC should also disclose the identity and qualifications of the personnel responsible for the initiative, the broad architecture of the systems being introduced, the standards used to evaluate their performance and the safeguards protecting electoral data from unauthorised access or manipulation. Where commercial confidentiality or cybersecurity considerations prevent the publication of particular technical details, the commission should explain those limitations and provide credible alternatives for independent scrutiny.

Most importantly, the technology must undergo independent testing under realistic electoral conditions before it is used in a consequential operation. Testing should include simulated cyberattacks, manipulated documents, inaccurate data, system failures and attempts to exploit weaknesses in automated verification. The results should be assessed by competent, independent specialists, with material findings and remedial measures made public.

If these safeguards cannot be established in time, INEC should restrict AI to clearly defined, low-risk support functions and exclude it from any role capable of changing, invalidating or determining election results.

The 2027 election must not become a live experiment in which Nigerians discover the weaknesses of an insufficiently tested system only after their votes have been cast.

Publish The Records And Make Verification Possible

The demand by the Obidient Movement for the publication of Forms EC8A, EC8B, EC8C, EC8D and EC8E on the IReV portal raises a broader question that INEC must confront: what is the most effective way to make election results independently verifiable?

The publication and accessibility of polling-unit results are central to public scrutiny. Where the relevant forms are available promptly and can be compared with figures recorded during collation, political parties, observers, journalists and citizens have a practical basis for identifying discrepancies and requesting explanations.

Digital publication alone, however, is not enough. The records must be legible, complete, accessible and traceable to their appropriate polling units and stages of collation. Procedures must also exist for documenting corrections, explaining discrepancies and preserving an auditable history of any authorised changes.

INEC should therefore publish a clear results-transparency protocol setting out when each category of result form will be uploaded, how missing or disputed documents will be handled, how the public can report inconsistencies and how the commission will respond to substantiated complaints.

The integrity of the process must not depend on citizens trusting an algorithm, a server or the word of an electoral official. It should depend on a system in which evidence can be examined and conclusions independently tested.

At the same time, the commission must distinguish between the legitimate publication and discussion of unofficial results and the false representation of figures as officially declared outcomes. It is entitled to protect the integrity of its statutory declaration process, but restrictions and warnings must be clearly grounded in the law and applied impartially. They must not be used to discourage legitimate reporting, scrutiny or peaceful political participation.

Transparency is not a concession INEC makes to political parties. It is an obligation owed to the electorate.

INEC Must Rise Above Partisan Suspicion

The commission cannot prevent political parties from interpreting its decisions through the lens of their electoral interests. Nor can it eliminate every suspicion that accompanies a closely contested national election. What it can do is ensure that its decisions are supported by clear explanations, demonstrable safeguards and procedures that apply equally to every participant.

The responsibility is especially heavy on an institution whose leadership is expected to inspire confidence across political divisions. INEC must avoid the appearance of introducing consequential changes without adequate consultation or presenting technology as a solution before explaining the problem it is intended to solve.

It should convene a broad stakeholder forum involving political parties, civil society organisations, election observers, media representatives, cybersecurity experts, data-protection specialists and independent technology professionals. The purpose should not be to secure superficial endorsements but to subject the proposed framework to serious examination, identify vulnerabilities and incorporate credible recommendations before deployment.

Such engagement must be followed by published guidelines, independent testing, public demonstrations and clear procedures for accountability. Nigerians should know which functions AI will perform, which functions it will not perform and who will bear responsibility if a system produces an incorrect assessment or contributes to an electoral failure.

The commission must also demonstrate that its plans are consistent with the applicable electoral laws and the legal authority of electoral officers. No administrative innovation, however sophisticated, can override statutory requirements or alter the rights of candidates and voters.

The same standards must apply whether the technology's findings appear favourable to the ruling party, an opposition party or a candidate with no established political backing. An electoral system is credible only when its rules are impartial and its decisions are defensible.

The 2027 Election Is Too Important For Experimentation

Nigeria is facing profound economic, security and social challenges. Millions of citizens look to the electoral process as a peaceful means of expressing their dissatisfaction, choosing new leaders or renewing the mandate of those they consider worthy of another term. For many voters, the ballot represents one of the few formal instruments through which they can hold political officeholders accountable.

That is why INEC must exercise exceptional care in the months preceding the 2027 elections. Public frustration does not justify threats or violence, and political disagreement must never become an excuse for undermining national stability. But neither can appeals for peace substitute for credible electoral administration.

A peaceful election is not merely one in which voters return home without violence. It is one in which votes are properly counted, results are transparently documented, disputes are resolved through lawful procedures and citizens have reasonable grounds to believe that the announced outcome reflects the votes cast.

Artificial intelligence may contribute to achieving these objectives, particularly in cybersecurity, fraud detection and the identification of inconsistencies. But it cannot compensate for weak institutions, poor communication, inadequate training or the absence of transparent procedures. Nor can it create public confidence by technological sophistication alone.

INEC must therefore reconsider the manner and pace of its proposed deployment, without automatically abandoning every potentially useful application of AI. Its immediate priority should be to publish the policy, subject the systems to independent testing, consult stakeholders and establish enforceable safeguards against automated errors, unauthorised interference and arbitrary decisions.

If the technology is intended only to strengthen cybersecurity and assist officials in identifying anomalies, the commission should say so unequivocally and explain how those functions will be separated from the statutory process of determining election results. If any application could influence the acceptance, rejection or alteration of results, its legal basis, operational limits and review procedures must be disclosed before it is used.

There must be no room for an opaque algorithm to become an alternative electoral authority.

Ultimately, the credibility of the 2027 elections will not be measured by the number of digital tools INEC introduces, the sophistication of its software or the novelty of its institutional arrangements. It will be measured by whether Nigerians can vote freely, whether their votes are accurately counted, whether the results can be independently verified and whether the commission demonstrates impartiality at every stage.

INEC has an opportunity to show that technological innovation and democratic accountability can reinforce each other. It should not squander that opportunity through secrecy, haste or dismissiveness towards legitimate concerns.

The commission must understand that public confidence is earned through evidence, not demanded through official assurances. Nigerians do not need an electoral process that merely looks technologically advanced; they need one that is demonstrably fair, transparent, secure and accountable.

The message to INEC is therefore simple: deploy technology only where it strengthens the integrity of the ballot, publish the rules before putting them into operation, preserve human and legal accountability, and make every result independently verifiable. If artificial intelligence can help achieve these objectives, let it be tested and used within clearly defined limits. If it cannot be adequately tested and safeguarded before the election, its use in consequential results verification should be postponed.

The votes belong to the people, the law must govern their treatment, and the electoral commission must remain accountable for the outcome. In 2027, Nigeria needs an election whose credibility can withstand scrutiny, not another controversy whose consequences will linger long after the ballots have been counted.